In §611 to §632 and in Part II, section 8 of his Philosophical Investigations (1958) , and very briefly in §97 of his Philosophical Grammar (1974) Wittgenstein talks about action and the will. His main idea behind these passages is the view that our mental vocabulary does not refer to any "inner" acts, states or processes. Our inner states or processes are not private objects that are known only to the person who has them. For Wittgenstein, to say that someone is in a given mental state is to say that he is in any of a large collection of publicly observable things. He supports this view by examining the workings of a representative selection of mental concepts, such * Professor, Department of Philosophy, University of Dhaka E-mail : mamuhit@hotmail.com as, understanding, deciding, believing, judging, expecting, intending, willing, etc. The present paper is an attempt to present a clear view of what Wittgenstein means by the concept of "willing" in his Philosophical Investigations.
It seems very difficult to find a common conceptual framework within which the notion of willing in Wittgenstein's later philosophy can be captured. But it is clearly understood from various passages in Philosophical Investigations that Wittgenstein has tried to characterize willing in both positive and negative ways. In fact, there are certain passages from which we can spell out clearly that his negative characterization outweighs more than his positive characterization. By an analysis of his negative treatment of willing we will try to come out with a positive characterization of this concept in Wittgenstein's later philosophy. We will see that his philosophical arguments to show that willing is not a particular kind of act give some indication that his whole notion of it is compatible with the language of some kind of philosophical behaviorism.
According to Wittgenstein, the notion of willing as a specific inner act is quite mythic: there is no inner mechanism which brings our actions about. Although he was not specific about it Wittgenstein here seems to be reacting (Hyman, 2014) (Locke 1979, 4 .10.19) Willing, Locke explains, is 'an act of the Mind, directing its thought to the production of any action, and thereby exerting its power to produce it' (ibid.,
2.21.28).
Willing is its proper name; but Locke concedes that it is hard to find the right words to describe it. At one point, he describes it as 'a thought or preference of the mind ordering, or, as it were, commanding the doing or not doing such or such a particular action' (ibid., 2.21.5). But he admits that the words preferring, ordering, and commanding do not capture the phenomenon precisely. He concludes that since willing is 'a very simple act, whosoever desires to understand what it is, will better find it by reflecting on his own mind, and observing what it does, when it wills, than by any variety of articulate sounds whatever' (ibid., 2.21.30). In other words, one should not try to define the act of will: one should simply discover it by introspection. Contra Locke, Wittgenstein argues that willing is not the name of an action; neither is it the name of a voluntary action. According to him, willing is not a causal mark of the voluntary. If "willing were some kind of causal bringing about, then it too could be brought "about". But the philosophical idea of willing excludes that possibility; "it makes no sense to speak of willing willing." ( §613) As if the willing of willing were a preparatory act of willing. However, I can bring about situations in which I have to will something. But that is not to will willing. Wittgenstein writes: 'In the sense in which I can ever bring anything about (such as stomach-ache through over-eating), I can also bring about an act of willing, In this sense I bring about the act of willing to swim by jumping into the water. Doubtless I was trying to say: I can't will willing; that is, it makes no sense to speak of willing willing. "Willing" is not the name of an action; and so not the name of any voluntary action either. And my use of a wrong expression came from our wanting to think of willing as an immediate non-causal bringing about.' ( §613)
From the last sentence of the above quotation it immediately follows that, for Wittgenstein, willing is not also some kind of special, non-causal bringing about. Here Wittgenstein suggests that there is an underlying picture which suggests the notion of a non-causal bringing about. "A misleading analogy lies at the root of this idea; the causal nexus seems to be established by a mechanism connecting two parts of a machine. The connection may be broken if the mechanism is disturbed. (We think only of disturbances to which a mechanism is normally subject, not, say, of cogwheels suddenly going soft, or passing through one another, and so on.)" ( §613) Willing, then, as we might picture it, is like part of the action mechanism, though it is not a physical item in the mechanism. So, it is a bringing about but not in the same sense as a causal mechanism. This is the reason of Wittgenstein speaking of the idea a "non-causal bringing about." But this seems to be a mystification. What is left of the analogy between voluntary bringing about and the causal mechanism if the notion of connecting parts of the mechanism is not present? Willing, for Wittgenstein, comes to be thought of as a mover which is not itself moved. He puts it in §618: 'One imagines the willing subject here as something without any mass (without any inertia); as a motor which has no inertia in itself to overcome. And so it is only mover, not moved. That is: One can say "I will, but my body does not obey me"-but not: "My will does not obey me." (Augustine.) ' Wittgenstein also denies that willing is an experience. In his Notebooks 1914-1916, he first mentions this point: "The act of will is not an experience." (p. 89, dated 9.11.16) In experience, Wittgenstein insists, something is given to us, something happens, or something is perceived. But in willing, a thing does not happen to us, rather we do something. The will cannot be a phenomenon, for every phenomenon only happens, is perceived by us, but is not something we do. In his Philosophical Grammar Wittgenstein substantiates this claim in the following way: "The will can't be a phenomenon, for whatever phenomenon you take is something that simply happens, something we undergo, not something we do. The will isn't something I see happen, it's more like my being involved in my actions, my being my actions." Look at your arm and move it and you will experience this very vividly: "You aren't observing it moving itself, you aren't having an experience -not just an experience, anyway -you're doing something." You may tell yourself that you could also imagine exactly the same thing happening to your hand, but merely observed and not willed by you. But shut your eyes, and move your arm so that you have, among other things, a certain experience: now ask yourself whether you still can imagine that you were having the same experience but without willing it. ( §97, p. 144) For Wittgenstein, willing is not an instrument or device whereby we perform such voluntary actions as walking, talking or imagining. It is not like a brake one uses to stop a movement or a lever one uses to shift power from one to another pulley. "When I raise my arm 'voluntarily' I do not use any instrument to bring the movement about. My wish is not such an instrument." ( §614) If we try to think of willing as instrument and not agent, it tends to reappear in the guise of an agent. "I'll walk," I might say, "so, I'd better will to bring my walking." So used, my willing will no longer serve to make the walking mine or even voluntary. That would be matter of my using willing, my doing that, and not a matter of its being willing that I happened to use. Thus, in §615 he remarks: '"Willing, if it is not to be a sort of wishing, must be the action itself. It cannot be allowed to stop anywhere short of the action." If it is the action, then it is so in the ordinary sense of the word; so it is speaking, writing, walking, lifting a thing, imagining something. But it is also trying, attempting, making an effort,-to speak, to write, to lift a thing, to imagine something etc.' What Wittgenstein means by the above remark is that if willing is just speaking, writing, walking, it can hardly be what makes instances of those actions voluntary. It may be pointed out here that Wittgenstein always argues against the idea of willing as mental states or mental acts, representing the deliberateness of voluntary actions, as something separate from the action itself. For him, willing is immanent in action itself; it neither evokes an action nor remain standing before action. In a certain way it is acting itself. One may answer to the question "How do you know that you have raised your arm?" as "I feel it." But for Wittgenstein, this answer is wrong, because it suggests that you recognize the special feeling, i.e., the kinaesthetic sensation, and can tell from recognizing them that their constant accompaniment, the raising of the arm, has occurred. The fact is that the certainty that you have raised your arm is itself a criterion of recognizing the feeling here. As Wittgenstein writes in §625: "And are you certain that you recognize it right?-You are certain that you have raised your arm; isn't this the criterion, the measure, of the recognition?" In his "Review of Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations" (Mind, LXVIII, 1954) P. F. Strawson remarks that "there are two things that Wittgenstein is not saying. He is not saying that one would have this certainty in the absence of any feeling, or in the presence of an unaccustomed feeling. It is no doubt because of the kinaesthetic sensations that I know; but it is not from them that I tell. Nor is he saying that I could never (say, if suitably stimulated) be mistaken about this. Here is a case where I know, but don't have a way of knowing, of telling." (p. 94) Wittgenstein reiterates the above claim that willing is not "feeling" in Part II of Philosophical Investigations in the following way. 'But after all,' Wittgenstein imagines his interlocutor saying, 'you must feel it, otherwise you wouldn't know (without looking) how your finger was moving' (p. 185). To this he replies: "But 'knowing' it only means: being able to describe it.-I may be able to tell the direction from which a sound comes only because it affects one ear more strongly than the other, but I don't feel this in my ears; yet it has its effect: I know the direction from which the sound comes; for instance, I look in that direction." (Ibid.) Wittgenstein's point is that whatever physiological mechanism enables me to know where a sound is coming from, there is no need to postulate a sensation corresponding to the direction. Similarly, whatever mechanism enables me to know how my finger is moving, there is no need to postulate a kinaesthetic sensation corresponding to the movement of my finger either. Pain, Wittgenstein points out, provides another analogy. I know that the itch is in my toe, but not because the itch has a toeish quality about it. And memory, he adds, provides yet another. I know I had toast for breakfast, but not because a feeling of pastness is associated with my thought of eating toast. As he writes: "It is the same with the idea that it must be some feature of our pain that advises us of the whereabouts of the pain in the body, and some feature of our memory image that tells us the time to which it belongs." (Ibid.) What Wittgenstein is saying here, in effect, is that if willing is deciding, the so-called act it is supposed to cause cannot be an act at all: it can only be a phenomenon I observe. 
